Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 Cvr

Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 – The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Its Role in the Investigation

On 25 February 2009, Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, a Boeing 737‑800 with registration TC‑JGE, crashed while attempting to land at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The accident resulted in the loss of nine lives and injured many others. One of the most important pieces of evidence gathered by the Dutch Safety Board (OVV) was the aircraft’s Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). The CVR captured the final minutes of cockpit conversation, providing investigators with a direct window into the crew’s actions, decisions, and the evolving situation that led to the stall and impact.

Recovery and Initial Examination of the CVR

The CVR was located in the wreckage shortly after the crash and was transported to the Dutch Safety Board’s laboratory for analysis. Despite the severe impact, the recorder’s memory module remained intact, allowing investigators to extract a continuous audio track lasting approximately 30 minutes. The recording began well before the final approach and continued until the moment of impact.

Technical staff verified the integrity of the audio, noting that background noise from the aircraft’s engines and avionics was present but did not obscure speech. The CVR was synchronized with the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) to create a combined timeline of aircraft parameters and cockpit communications.

Key Findings from the CVR Transcript

The transcript of the CVR, later released in the OVV final report, revealed several critical aspects of the flight’s final moments:

• Altitude awareness issues: The captain and first officer repeatedly referenced conflicting altitude indications. The captain’s primary altimeter showed a higher altitude than the radio altimeter, which was providing erroneous low‑altitude readings due to a malfunction.
• Failure to recognize the stall: As the aircraft descended below the safe approach speed, the crew discussed the aircraft’s “slow” feeling but did not identify the developing aerodynamic stall. The CVR captured statements such as “we’re sinking” and “power?” followed by delayed thrust application.
• Crew resource management: The jump‑seat occupant, Olgay Osgur, offered occasional inputs, but the transcript shows that the captain, Hasan Tahsin Arisan, and first officer, Murat Sezer, ultimately made the decisions. The recording indicates a lack of explicit challenge to the captain’s interpretation of the altimeter data.
• Communications with air traffic control: The CVR includes the crew’s read‑backs of ATC instructions and their requests for clarification regarding runway visibility and approach lighting. No distress call was transmitted before impact.

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